Research on the developmental conservation of intangible cultural heritage from the perspective of evolutionary game

Chen Lilong

Intangible cultural heritage in modern conditions can be used with economic benefit if a strategy for its protection is adopted. In this case, it is assumed that the heirs of the intangible cultural heritage will cooperate with enterprises to develop it and turn the heritage into a commodity in order to make a profit through marketing. With the help of the evolutionary theory of games, the article analyzes the behavior of game subjects consisting of heirs of intangible cultural heritage and enterprises for its development, as well as factors affecting the strategies of evolutionary stability. According to the corresponding costs and benefits of different behavioral strategies, the profit matrix of both sides of the game is calculated. The results obtained show that the investment behavior of the enterprise is closely related to the investment profitability. Therefore, the decision of the enterprise to cooperate with the heir should take into account his legal awareness. Permissive behavior of the heir will contribute to net profit. Analyzing the influence of various factors on the investment behavior of enterprises and the permissive behavior of heirs, it is possible to identify positive aspects that contribute to the beneficial development of the protection and use of intangible cultural heritage.

Keywords:intangible cultural heritage conservation; developmental conservation strategies; Evolutionary game theory.